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Abstract
We investigate the social desirability of free entry in the co-opetition model in which firms com-
pete in a homogeneous product market while sharing common property resources that affect market
size or consumers’ willingness to pay for products. We show that free entry leads to socially exces-
sive or insufficient entry into the market in the case of non-commitment co-opetition, depending on
the magnitude of “business stealing” and “common property” effects of entry. On the other hand,
in the case of pre-commitment co-opetition, free entry leads to excess entry and a decline in the
common property resources. Interestingly, in the latter case, the excess entry result of Mankiw and
Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) holds even when there are no entry (set-up) costs
for entrants. These results have important policy implications for entry regulations.
Keywords Excess entry; Free entry; Co-opetition; Entry regulations; Common property resource
JEL Code L13; D43; L51
1 Introduction
In many industries, firms compete for market share while cooperating in the management of “common
property resources” that affect the market size or consumers’ willingness to pay for products. This simul-
taneous competition and cooperation is called “co-opetition” (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996). For
example, retail stores in shopping malls, tourist sites, and food courts share common property resources
such as parking lots, historic ruins and a natural environment, and dining areas, respectively. The quality
of the common property resources affects the market size and/or consumers’ willingness to pay for the
products or services, and high quality of the resources generates non-excludable benefits for firms in the
industry. Therefore, each firm’s investment in the common property resources—such as eliminating con-
gestion by expanding parking lots in shopping malls, preserving historic ruins and natural environment
of tourist sites, and maintaining a clean, hygienic environment in food courts—create public goods from
which all the firms benefit. Another example of such co-opetitive behavior is generic advertising for
various commodities, such as tea, oranges, milk, butter, cheese, beef, fish, and eggs. Creating a better
product image generates non-excludable benefits for all producers who provide the same products. In
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this case, firms share the product image as a common resource and, sometimes, voluntarily contribute to
improve the image.1
Is free entry into such co-opetitive industries desirable from a social welfare point of view? To answer
this question, we need to identify how firm entry into such a market can affect social efficiency. One way
is the well-known “business stealing” effect of entry that creates production inefficiency in an industry
(Mankiw and Whinston 1986). This generally results in socially excessive entry. Another is the effect
of entry on the amount of common property resources, which we call the “common resource” effect of
entry. On the one hand, an increase in the number of firms may increase the total investment in the
common property resources. In this case, free entry may result in socially insufficient entry because
firms do not consider the positive external effect of their investment in the common property resources
on other firms. On the other hand, an increase in the number of firms may exacerbate the under-provision
of common property resources among firms and, thus, may lead to a tragedy-of-commons situation. For
instance, an increase in tourism firms can deteriorate the quality of tourist attractions (such as wild life
and historic ruins) and can eventually destroy tourism itself. As Puppim de Oliveira (2003) indicates,
places like Acapulco in Mexico, the French Rivera and Mallorca and Torremolinos in Spain have faced
tourism-related environmental problems. In this case, the common property effect contributes to socially
excessive entry. These conjectures lead us to the question of whether government should regulate or
encourage firm entry into the co-opetitive industry.
In this paper, we formulate a simple model of co-opetition with endogenous entry to present a wel-
fare analysis of free entry equilibrium. In particular, we consider whether the number of firms that
can enter a co-opetitive market is excessive or insufficient from the viewpoint of social welfare. We
distinguish two types of co-opetitive investment in common property resources: investment with and
without commitment. In the case of non-commitment investment, firms are modeled to choose their
output and investment at the same stage. We call the game “simultaneous co-opetition game.” In the
case of pre-commitment investment, firms decide their investment before they choose outputs. We call
the game “sequential co-opetition game.” In either game, firms’ entry decisions are made at the first
stage. The difference between non-commitment and pre-commitment investments reflects the difference
in reversibility and persistency in investment. When investment has long-term impacts and is difficult
to reverse (e.g., renovating historic building and expanding parking lots), the investment has strategic
commitment value, which can be described by sequential co-opetition game. On the other hand, when
investment has short-term impacts only and is easy to reverse (e.g., providing generic advertising on
the daily newspaper and cleaning up the shopping mall or food courts), the investment has no strategic
commitment value, which can be described as a simultaneous co-opetition game.
We show that whether free entry into a co-opetitive industry is socially excessive or insufficient de-
pends on the following two effects: business stealing and common property effects of entry. The former,
as is well known from previous studies such as Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono
(1987), originates from the fact that an entrant firm does not take into account its negative impact (exter-
nality) on the profits of other firms. Therefore, when firms face a fixed entry (set-up) cost, the business
stealing effect leads to excess entry of firms in the market. The latter effect is novel and depends on the
effect of entry on the total amount (or quality) of common property resources. An increase in the number
of entrants will increase the incentive to free ride on investments in common property resources (public
1Other possible examples of co-opetition include development of open source software and rent-seeking or lobbying to get
permission to sell product to certain groups (e.g., the permission to sell tobacco to under-age people, specific medicines to wide
mass of people, and financial products to inexperienced consumers).
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goods) made by other firms. However, the quality of common property resources may be increased by a
rise in the number of entrants. If that is the case, entry generates positive external effects on other firms.
Because private firms do not take the positive externality into account when deciding whether to enter a
market, this common property effect leads to insufficient entry. On the other hand, if market entry results
in a decline in the common property resources, entry causes negative external effects on other firms. In
this case, a negative common property effect leads to excess entry.
We find that, in the simultaneous co-opetition game, an increase in the number of firms increases
the total amount of investment in common property resources while reducing individual investment.
Therefore, the business stealing and common property effects work in opposite directions. In other
words, whether free entry is socially excessive or insufficient depends on the relative magnitude of the
two effects. In particular, by providing two concrete examples that assume linear and constant elasticity
demand, we show that free entry is more likely to result in socially insufficient entry when initial market
size, investment cost, and production cost are smaller and/or the demand is more elastic.
However, the business stealing and common property effects work in the same directions in the se-
quential co-opetition game in which the investment has a commitment value. The important thing here
is that the total amount investment in common property resources is decreased by an increase in the
number of entrants, that is, the common property effect is negative. This is in contrast to the result of the
simultaneous co-opetition game. This is because, when the investment has a commitment value, an in-
crease in firm’s investments induces rival firms to respond more aggressively by increasing their outputs
in the subsequent stage. Therefore, this pre-commitment effect of investment reduces the incentive for
investment in common property resources. Because an increase in the number of rival firms strengthens
the pre-commitment effect, the sequential co-opetition game gives rise to a negative common property
effect of entry. In other words, a marginal entry actually decreases the total amount of public goods. As
a result, excess entry holds in sequential co-opetition. Interestingly, we show that excess entry results
hold for the sequential co-opetition game even when there are no entry (set-up) costs.
Our results enrich the established excess entry theorem in theoretical industrial organization literature,
developed by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987).2 Their studies show that
in a Cournot model with homogenous products, free entry is socially excessive when firms have fixed
entry costs.3 First, our results from the simultaneous co-opetition game suggest that free entry may
lead to socially insufficient entry when firms share common property resources that affect the market
size or the consumers’ willingness to pay for the product. Second, excess entry holds in the sequential
co-opetition game even when firms have no entry costs.
The excess entry theorem has been extended in various directions. For example, Konishi et al.
(1990) extend the traditional Cournot model with free entry to a general equilibrium model and ex-
plore Pareto-improving tax-subsidy policies. Incorporating strategic cost-reducing R&D activities into
Cournot model with free entry, Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura (1993) show that the existence of R&D
investment strengthens the tendency of excess entry in a free-entry equilibrium.4 There is a critical differ-
ence between R&D investment in their study and investment in common property resources in our study:
in the former, investment generates private benefits for the investing firm, while in the latter, investment
2See also von Weizsacker (1980) and Perry (1984).
3Berry and Waldfogel (1999) empirically examine the problem of excess entry into U.S. commercial radio broadcasting and
estimate the welfare loss from excess entry.
4Haruna and Goel (2011) also consider the problem of excess entry in the presence of cost-reducing R&D with spillovers
and show that whether free entry is socially excessive or insufficient depends on the degree of research spillovers.
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generates public benefits for all firms.
Some previous studies find that free entry can result in socially insufficient entry (e.g., Spence 1976,
Dixit and Stiglitz 1977, Ku¨hn and Vives 1999, and Ghosh and Saha 2007). Ghosh and Morita (2007)
consider a vertical relationship between industries in a homogeneous Cournot model and show that free
entry in the upstream sector can lead to socially insufficient entry. The driving force behind their in-
sufficient entry result is that entry in the upstream sector has positive external effect on the downstream
sector’s profit. On the other hand, the driving force behind our insufficient-entry result is that entry may
have positive external effect on other firms’ profits through changes in the quality of common property
resources. Incorporating a constant elasticity demand into a standard Salop (1979) spatial framework,
Gu and Wenzel (2009) show that the excess entry theorem does not hold when the price elasticity of
demand is large. Although their study differs from ours in several respects, their conclusions are similar:
insufficient entry occurs when the price elasticity of demand is large. Therefore, the degree of price
elasticity of demand may serve as a guideline for entry regulation policy.56
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of the model. Section
3 considers a simultaneous co-opetition game, investigates the properties of a free-entry equilibrium,
and compares it with the second-best solution. In addition, we present two examples that specify the
functional form of demand (linear and constant elasticity demands) and cost to provide a more concrete
results. Section 4 investigates the same for a sequential co-opetition game. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 Basic Framework
Consider n firms producing a homogenous good. Firms compete in their outputs in a market while they
can invest in common property resources which has a public good nature among all the competing firms.
Profits of firm i (i = 1;    ; n) is given by
i = P (Q;Z)  qi   C(qi) D(zi) K; (1)
where P (Q;Z) is the market price (or inverse demand) of the product, qi  0 is firm i’s output, Q Pn
i qi is the industry output, zi  0 is the amount of firm i’s investment (or individual contribution
to common property resources), Z  Pni zi is the total amount of investment (or quality of common
property resources), C(qi) is the cost function for production, D(zi) is the cost function for investment,
and K  0 is the fixed entry (set-up) costs. The inverse demand P (Q;Z) has the property of PQ < 0,
PZ > 0, PZZ  0. The second and third properties mean that increasing the total amount of investment
enlarges the willingness to pay of consumers, but by a non-increasing rate. The production cost function
C() has C 0 > 0 and C 00  0, and the investment cost function D() has D0 > 0 and D00  0.
We consider the following two types of co-opetition behavior of firms: simultaneous and sequential
co-opetition. In simultaneous co-opetition, firms’ investments have no commitment value and are mod-
eled to be decided simultaneously with outputs. Therefore, the simultaneous co-opetition is modeled as
5Matsumura and Okamura (2006) show that the equilibrium number of firms can be either excessive or insufficient in a
spatial price discrimination model. Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2008) theoretically show that free entry can result in socially
insufficient entry in the presence of technology licensing.
6For the welfare evaluation of entry regulation, Kim (1997) considers the strategic behavior of firms and the government
and shows that entry regulation to prevent excess entry induces the incumbent to behave strategically against the government.
As a result, the final outcome is socially suboptimal compared to the case without government intervention.
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a two-stage game: in the first stage, firms make entry decisions and the number of firms in the industry
is endogenously decided; in the second stage, each firm non-cooperatively decides on its investment and
outputs. On the other hand, in sequential co-opetition, firms’ investments are committed and are modeled
to be decided before choosing outputs. Therefore, the sequential co-opetition is modeled as a three-stage
game: in the first stage, firms make entry decisions; in the second stage, each firm non-cooperatively
decides on its investment; in the last stage, each firm engages in Cournot competition. Within the above
framework, we derive the number of firms in a free-entry equilibrium and then compare it with the
socially optimal number of firms.
To obtain clear and intuitive results, we employ specific functional forms. We consider the following
two types of demands. One is linear demand expressed by
P (Q;Z) = (a+ Z)  bQ; (2)
where a and b are positive constants. Obviously, PQ =  b < 0, PZ = 1 > 0, and PZZ = 0, which
satisfy our assumptions stated before. The other is constant elasticity demand expressed by
P (Q;Z) =

a+ Z
Q
1=
; (3)
where a is positive constant and  is a price elasticity of demand. We further assume   1 to satisfy
PZZ  0. Furthermore, we employ the constant marginal cost of production C(qi) = c qi, where c > 0
and the quadratic investment cost function D(zi) = (d=2)(zi)2, where d > 0.
3 Free entry under simultaneous co-opetition
In this section, we consider the simultaneous co-opetition where firms’ investments have no commitment
power. This situation can be modeled by a procedure where each firm decides upon its outputs and
investment simultaneously.
3.1 Production and investment decisions
The game is solved by backward induction. The first-order conditions for profit maximization are
PQ  qi + P   C 0 = 0; (4)
PZ  qi  D0 = 0: (5)
We assume that a symmetric Nash equilibrium exists.7 We denote the symmetric Nash equilibrium
amount of output and investment per firm as q^(n) and z^(n), and the total amount of output and investment
as Q^(n) = nq^(n) and Z^(n) = nz^(n).
7For the existence and uniqueness of symmetric Nash equilibrium, we should assume (1 + n)PQ +QPQQ < 0 (see Vives
1999) and the Hessian matrix to be negative devinite.
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In a symmetric equilibrium, from (4) and (5), we have the following comparative static results:
dq^
dn
=   1

n 
PZZQ^ D00
h
q^ (PQQq^ + PQ) + z^(PQZ q^ + PZ)
i
  PQZQ^+ nPZ  PQZ q^2 + PZZ q^ z^o;
dz^
dn
=   1

n
( PQZQ^  PZ)
h
q^ (PQQq^ + PQ) + z^(PQZ q^ + PZ)
i
 
h
PQQQ^+ PQ (n+ 1)  C 00
i  
PQZ q^
2 + PZZ q^ z^
o
;
dQ^
dn
=
1

n
q^(D00   PZZQ^)(C 00   PQ) + (PQZQ^+ nPZ)(z^D00  D0)
o
dZ^
dn
=
1

n
q^(PQZQ^+ PZ)(C 00   PQ) +

PQQQ^+ (n+ 1)PQ   C 00

(z^D00  D0)
o
;
where the determinant is
 
h
PQQQ^+ (n+ 1)PQ   C 00
i
(PZZQ^ D00)  (PQZQ^+ nPZ)(PQZQ^+ PZ) > 0:
From the above comparative statics, we find that dZ^=dn > 0 holds for (a) PQZQ^ + PZ > 0 and
(b) z^D00   D0  0. The condition (a) holds naturally because it only requires the marginal profit of
production to be increasing function of z. The condition (b) requires the investment cost function not to
be too convex. In general, these signs are ambiguous, but dq^=dn < 0, dz^=dn < 0, dQ^=dn > 0, and
dZ^=dn > 0 are quite likely to hold in practice. In the following, we confirm that they hold for linear and
constant elasticity demand cases.
 Linear demand case
In the linear demand case, we obtain the symmetric equilibrium of the second stage as
q^ =
(a  c)d
^
; z^ =
a  c
^
; (6)
where the determinant  in this linear demand case is ^ = bd(1 + n)   n > 0 by assumption, which
also means bd > 1 and d^=dn > 0. Then, we have
dq^
dn
=  (a  c)(bd  1)d
^2
< 0;
dQ^
dn
=
(a  c)bd2
^2
> 0;
dz^
dn
=  (a  d)(bd  1)
^2
< 0;
dZ^
dn
=
(a  c)bd
^2
> 0;
which indicates that individual outputs and investments decrease, whereas the total output and invest-
ments increase as the number of firms increases. Furthermore, we have
lim
n!1 q^ = limn!1 z^ = 0; limn!1 Q^ =
(a  c)d
bd  1 > 0; limn!1 Z^ =
a  c
bd  1 > 0;
which implies that individual outputs and investments converge to zero as the number of firms approaches
infinity, while the total output and investment converges to positive and finite values.
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 Constant elasticity demand case
In the constant elasticity demand case, we obtain the symmetric equilibrium of the second stage as
q^ =
(a d +  1)
nd 
; z^ =
 1
nd 
; (7)
where
  n  1
c n 
> 0;
and d=dn > 0. We can also confirm that the determinant is positive because
 =
c n d2 1 2
1 + a d 1 
> 0:
Then, we have the following comparative statics:
dq^
dn
=  
2 1(n  2) + ad [(n  1)   1] 1 	
n2 d(n  1) < 0;
dz^
dn
=  (n  1)
 1
n2d(n  1) < 0;
dQ^
dn
=
2 1

(2  1) + ad21 
nd(n  1) > 0;
dZ^
dn
=
(  1) 1
nd(n  1) > 0:
As the number of firms increases, individual outputs and investments decrease, whereas the total output
and investment increases. Also, we have
lim
n!1 q^ = limn!1 z^ = 0; limn!1 Q^ =
c 2(c+ acd)
d
> 0; lim
n!1 Z^ =
c1 
d
> 0;
which implies that individual outputs and investments converge to zero as the number of firms approaches
infinity, while the total output and investment converges to positive and finite values.
3.2 Entry decisions and the second best
In the first stage, firms enter the market until their profits fall to zero. Therefore, the free entry number
of firms is defined as n^f such that
^ (n^f ) = P

Q^(n^f ); Z^(n^f )

q^(n^f )  C (q^(n^f )) D (z^(n^f )) K = 0: (8)
We then consider the second-best problem for a social planner who can control the number of firms
entering the market. Let cW (n) denote the total surplus as
cW (n)  Z Q^
0
P (s; Z^)ds  nC(q^)  nD(z^)  nK:
Using (4) and (5), we have
cW 0(n) = P q^ + ndq^
dn

+ PZQ^

z^ + n
dz^
dn

  C   nC 0 dq^
dn
 D   nD0 dz^
dn
 K
= ^   PQQ^ dq^
dn
+ PZQ^

dz^
dn
(n  1) + z^

:
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The social planner chooses the second-best number of firms n = n^sb that maximizes cW (n), which
implies cW 0(n^sb) = 0 if n^sb > 1:
We assume that the second-order condition should be satisfied, that is, cW 00(n) < 0. Because ^ = 0
when n = n^f , we have cW 0(n^f ) =  PQQ^ dq^
dn| {z }
business stealing
+ PZQ^
dZ^ 1
dn| {z }
common property
; (9)
where Z^ 1  (n  1)z^. Thus, we find that n^f > n^sb holds when (9) is negative. In this case, free entry
leads to excess entry. On the other hand, n^f < n^sb holds when (9) is positive. In this case, free entry
leads to insufficient entry.
The first term on the right-hand side of (9) is the well-known “business stealing” effect of entry
(Mankiw and Whinston 1986). Firms enter the market without taking into account the negative impact
of their entry on the profitability of their rivals. As shown below, the term is usually negative. The second
term represents the “common property” effect of entry. Firms do not take into account the positive impact
of their investment (or contribution to common property resources) on the profitability of their rivals. As
is shown above (dZ^=dn > 0 holds for both linear and constant elasticity demand cases), the term is
usually positive in this simultaneous co-opetition case. Therefore, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1
In a simultaneous co-opetition game, free entry results in socially insufficient entry when cW 0(n^f ) > 0
and socially excessive entry when cW 0(n^f ) < 0. In particular, insufficient entry results hold when the
common property effect dominates the business stealing effect of entry.
In the following, we clearly demonstrate under what conditions the excess or insufficient entry theo-
rem applies in linear and constant elasticity demand cases.
 Linear demand case
From (6), the free-entry equilibrium number of firms, n^f , satisfies
^(n^f ) =
(a  c)2(2bd  1)d
2 [bd(1 + n^f )  n^f ]2
 K = 0:
Because ^(n) is strictly decreasing in n and limn!1 ^ =  K, we confirm that
lim
K!0
n^f =1:
Therefore, the number of firms under free entry goes to infinity when there are no entry costs.
The socially optimal (second-best) number of firms, n^sb, satisfies,
cW 0(n^sb) = ^(n^sb)  (a  c)2dn^sb
[bd(1 + n^sb)  n^sb]3
 
1  3bd+ b2d2 = 0:
We have cW 0(n)
K=0
=
(a  c)2d[n(3bd  1) + bd(2bd  1)]
2 [bd(1 + n^sb)  n^sb]3
> 0;
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which implies that
lim
K!0
n^sb =1:
Therefore, the second-best number of firms goes to infinity when there are no entry costs. Then, we have
cW 0(n^f ) =   (a  c)2dn^f
[bd(1 + n^f )  n^f ]3
 
1  3bd+ b2d2 Q 0 , bd R 3 +p5
2
:
Thus, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Under linear demand, constant marginal production cost, and quadratic investment cost,
the free-entry equilibrium of the simultaneous co-opetition game yields excessive (insufficient) entry for
greater (smaller) investment costs and/or steeper (flatter) inverse demand.
The greater (smaller) b and/or d, the more likely free entry leads to excess (insufficient) entry. This
result is quite intuitive. When b is large (or the demand is less elastic), the equilibrium price is greatly
decreased by firm entry, which leads to a greater business stealing effect of entry. Also, when d is large
(or the investment is more costly), the total investment is less sensitive to firm entry, which leads to a
smaller common property effect of entry.
We provide a numerical example: in the case of a = 10; b = 1; c = 1; and K = 2, we find that
n^f  9 < n^sb  12 for d = 2, which corresponds to the insufficient entry theorem. On the other hand,
we find that n^f  6 > n^sb  4 for d = 6, which corresponds to the excess entry theorem.
 Constant elasticity demand case
From (12), the free-entry equilibrium number of firms, n^f , satisfies
^(n^f ) =
c2 1
 
1 + 2ad1 

2nd(n  1)  K = 0:
Because ^(n) is strictly decreasing in n and limn!1 ^ =  K, we confirm
lim
K!0
n^f =1:
Thus, the free-entry number of firms goes to infinity when there are no entry costs as in the linear demand
case.
The socially optimal number of firms, n^sb, satisfies,
cW 0(n^sb) = ^(n^sb)  cad (n^sb  1) [ (n^sb   1)  1]  cn^sb [ (n^f + 1)  n^sb] 	(n^sb  1)3dn^sb = 0:
We also find that
lim
K!0
n^sb =1;
which implies that the second-best number of firms goes to infinity asK approaches zero.
Then we have
cW 0(n^f ) =  cad (n^f   1) [ (n^f   1)  1]  cn^f [ (n^f + 1)  n^f ] 	(n^f   1)3dn^f Q 0
, d R c n^f [(n^f + 1)  n^f ] 

a(n^f   1)[(n^f   1)  1]:
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Figure 1: Equilibrium number of firms and the second-best: the case for  = 3 (left) and  = 1:2 (right).
Therefore, we find that the excess (insufficient) entry theorem applies for larger (smaller) values of a, d
and c. We cannot analytically derive the impact of  on the sign of cW 0(n^f ), but the numerical examples
demonstrate the tendency that the excess entry theorem is more likely to hold for the smaller value of ,
that is, when the demand is less elastic.
Corollary 2 Under constant elasticity demand, constant marginal production cost, and quadratic in-
vestment cost, the free-entry equilibrium of the simultaneous co-opetition game yields excessive (insuf-
ficient) entry for larger (smaller) market size, greater (smaller) investment and production costs, and
smaller (greater) price elasticity of demand.
Varian (1995) demonstrates that excessive entry results hold for constant elasticity demand cases in
his simple Cournot model with endogenous entry. Our result extends his result by allowing firms co-
opetitive investment and shows that free entry leads to either excessive or insufficient entry depending
on the value of the price elasticity and investment costs.
We provide some numerical examples. In the case of a = 2, c = 0:1,  = 2, and K = 0:1, we find
that n^f  14 and n^sb  19 for d = 1, and n^f  10 and n^sb  8 for d = 8. Therefore, free entry leads
to excess (insufficient) entry when d is large (small). In the case of a = 2, c = 0:1, d = 3, andK = 0:1,
we find that n^f  49 < n^sb  74 for  = 3, and n^f  5 > n^sb  4 for  = 1:2. Figure 1 depicts
this situation. In each panel of Figure 1, profits and welfare at the second-stage equilibrium are depicted.
The left (right) panel depicts the case in which the price elasticity of demand is high (low). We see from
the figure that the excess (insufficient) entry occurs in the right (left) panel.
4 Free entry under sequential co-opetition
In this section, we consider the sequential co-opetition. Here we think of a three-stage game. In the
first stage, firms enter the market. In the second stage, firms decide upon their investment, and then
in the third stage, firms choose output (in a Cournot fashion). In contrast to the previous simultaneous
co-opetition game, investment in this game has a strategic nature in the sense that each firm strategically
chooses its investment taking into account its effect on market competition in the subsequent stage.
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4.1 Production decisions
As before, the game is solved by backward induction. In the third stage, firms choose their outputs. The
first-order conditions are given by (4). Then, a symmetric Nash equilibrium output per firm is given
by ~q(n;Z) with @~q=@n < 0 and @~q=@zi = @~q=@zj > 0, for i 6= j. In addition, the total output in a
symmetric equilibrium is ~Q(n;Z) with @ ~Q=@n > 0 and @ ~Q=@zi = @ ~Q=@zj > 0, for i 6= j.8
4.2 Investment decisions
In the second stage, each firm chooses the amount of investment by solving the following maximization
problem given other firms’ investment Z i 
P
j 6=i zj :
max
zi
i(zi; Z i) = P

~Q; zi + Z i

~q   C(~q) D(zi) K:
Using (4), the first-order conditions are given as follows:9
@i
@zi
=

PQ
@~q
@zi
(n  1) + PZ

~q  D0 = 0: (10)
The comparison of (5) with (10) clarifies the difference between investment choices in simultaneous
and sequential co-opetition games. In the sequential co-opetition game, firms choose investment with
anticipation that their own investment will make the rival aggressive (increases rival’s output) as repre-
sented by the first term in the parentheses of (10). This “pre-commitment” effect of investment reduces
the incentive for investment. Therefore, ceteris paribus, firms’ incentives to invest are smaller in the
sequential co-opetition game, as compared to the simultaneous co-opetition game.
Solving (10) for all i = 1;    ; n, we derive the equilibrium amount of investment in a symmetric
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium at the second stage as denoted by z(n) and Z(n)  nz. In addition,
we denote the equilibrium output in a symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium at the second stage
as q(n)  ~q(n; Z) and Q(n)  ~Q(n; Z).
The effects of entry on q, z, Q, and Z are quite complex. Therefore, in the following, we provide the
comparative static results for linear and constant elasticity demand cases.
 Linear demand case
Specifying the inverse demand as (2), we obtain the third-stage equilibrium:
~q(n;Z) =
a  c+ Z
b(n+ 1)
; ~Q(n;Z) =
n(a  c+ Z)
b(n+ 1)
:
8In detail, we have the comparative static results:
@~q
@n
=   PQQ~q
2 + PQ~q
PQQ ~Q+ (n+ 1)PQ   C00
< 0;
@~q
@zi
=
@~q
@zj
=   PZ
PQQ ~Q+ (n+ 1)PQ   C00
> 0;
@ ~Q
@n
=
(PQ   C00)~q
PQQ ~Q+ (n+ 1)PQ   C00
> 0;
@ ~Q
@zi
=
@ ~Q
@zj
=   nPZ
PQQ ~Q+ (n+ 1)PQ   C00
> 0:
9We assume that the second-order conditions are satisfied, i.e.,
@2i
@z2i
=

PQ
@~q
@zi
(n  1) + PZ

@~q
@zi
+

PQQ
@ ~Q
@zi
@~q
@zi
(n  1) + PQ @
2~q
@z2i
(n  1) + PZZ

~q  D00 < 0:
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We can easily confirm that @~q=@n < 0, @~q=@zi > 0, @ ~Q=@n > 0, and @ ~Q=@zi = @ ~Q=@zj > 0.
Solving the second-stage problem for firm i, we have the following reaction function:
zi = Ri(Z i)  2(a  c)(n+ 1)2bd  2 +
2
(n+ 1)2bd  2Z i;
which indicates that the investment choices are strategic complement. The second-stage equilibrium is
characterized as:
q(n) =
(a  c)(n+ 1)d

; z(n) =
2(a  c)

; (11)
where   (n+ 1)2bd  2n > 0 from the stability of Nash equilibrium in the second stage. Therefore,
we find that
dq
dn
=  (a  c)d[(n+ 1)
2bd  2]
2
< 0;
dz
dn
=  4(a  c)[(n+ 1)bd  1]
2
< 0;
d Q
dn
=
(a  c)2d[(n+ 1)2bd  2n2]
2
;
d Z
dn
=  2bd(a  c)(n
2   1)
2
< 0:
We should notice that d Z=dn < 0 holds for any n, which indicates that an increase in the number of
firms actually decreases total investment as well as individual investment. Furthermore, we have
lim
n!1 q = limn!1 z = limn!1
Z = 0; lim
n!1
Q =
a  c
b
> 0;
that is, as the number of firms increases, the total outputs converge to the perfect competition outcome
without investment activities because the amount of common property resources converge to zero. This
is quite contrasting to the case of simultaneous co-opetition.
 Constant elasticity demand case
Specifying the inverse demand as (3), we obtain the third-stage equilibrium:
~q(n;Z) =
(a+ Z)
n
; ~Q(n;Z) = (a+ Z):
We obtain @~q=@n < 0, @~q=@zi > 0, @ ~Q=@n > 0, and @ ~Q=@zi = @ ~Q=@zj > 0.
Solving for the second-stage problem, we have
z =
c
(n  1)nd; q =
a
n
+
c2
(n  1)dn: (12)
The comparative static yields the following:
dq
dn
=  
2 1 f2(n  1)  1g+ adn f(n  1)  1g1 
dn2(n  1) < 0;
dz
dn
=   [(2n  1)  1]
 1
dn2(n  1) < 0;
d Q
dn
=
2 1

adn1    (n  2)c
dn2(n  1) ;
d Z
dn
=  (n  1)
 1
dn2(n  1) < 0:
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In addition, we have
lim
n!1 q = limn!1 z = limn!1
Z = 0; lim
n!1
Q = ac  > 0;
Therefore, we find that, as the number of firms increases, the total output converges to the perfect com-
petition outcome without investment activities and the total amount of investment converges to zero, as
in the linear demand case.
4.3 Entry decisions and the second best
In the first stage, firms enter the market until their profits fall to zero. Therefore, the free entry number
of firms is defined as nf such that
 (nf ) = P
  Q (nf ) ; Z (nf )  q (nf )  C (q (nf )) D (z (nf )) K = 0
We then consider the second-best problem for a social planner who can control the number of firms
entering the market. LetW (n) denote the total surplus as
W (n) 
Z Q
0
P (s; Z)ds  nC(q)  nD(z)  nK:
Then we have
W
0(n) = P

q + n
dq
dn

+ PZ Q

z + n
dz
dn

  C   nC 0 dq
dn
 D   nD0 dz
dn
 K
=    PQ Q

dq
dn
+
@~q
@z
dz
dn
(n  1)

+ PZ Q

dz
dn
(n  1) + z

:
The social planner chooses n = nsb that maximizesW (n), which implies
W
0(n)jn=nsb = 0 if nsb > 1:
We assume that the second-order condition should be satisfied (W 00 < 0). Thus we have
W
0(nf ) =  PQ Q
"
dq
dn
+
@ ~Q 1
@z
dz
dn
#
| {z }
business stealing
+ PZ Q
d Z 1
dn| {z }
common property
: (13)
The first term is the business stealing effect of entry. The sign of this term is negative. Private
firms consider neither the negative direct impact of their entry on rivals’ outputs (that is represented by
dq=dn < 0) nor the negative indirect impact through the change in rivals’ investments (this is represented
by (d ~Q 1=dz)(dz=dn) < 0). The second term is the common property effect of entry. Different than
the case of non-commitment investment, the sign of the effect is negative when d Z=dn < 0 holds in the
second stage. Private firms do not take into account the negative impact of their entry on the profitability
of their rivals through the decrease in total amount of investment or public good. Then we have the
following proposition.
Proposition 2
In a sequential co-opetition game, the free entry more likely to result in socially excessive entry and the
depletion of common property resources.
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The proposition contrasts with the result in the simultaneous co-opetition case shown by Proposition
1. In the sequential co-opetition case, each firm chooses its investment with anticipation that its own
investment increases not only its own output but also rivals’ outputs in the subsequent stage due to the
pre-commitment effect of investment as in (10). Therefore, each firm’s investment is strategically chosen
to be smaller than that in the simultaneous case. In addition, as the number of firms increases, the
strategic effect is strengthened. As a result, the total amount of investment is a decreasing function of
the number of firms in the market. In general, the total provision of voluntarily provided public goods
is an increasing function of the number of players, while the individual contribution to public goods is
a decreasing function of it. However, in our case, the total amount of public goods (investment) is also
decreasing function of the number of firms. This is because when n increases, there are two channels
to reduce firms’ incentive to invest: firms tend to free ride on the contributions of others and individual
outputs become small, which reduces the marginal profits of investment.
In the following, we confirm the proposition for the linear and constant elasticity demand cases. We
obtain a strong result that excess entry results hold for the sequential co-opetition game even if the entry
costs are zero.
 Linear demand case
From (11), the free-entry equilibrium number of firms, nf , satisfies
(nf ) =
(a  c) (nf + 1)2bd  2 d
2
 K = 0:
From the fact that (n) is strictly decreasing in n and limn!1 =  K, we confirm
lim
K!0
nf =1;
which indicates that the free-entry number of firms goes to infinity when there are no entry costs. After
some tedious manipulation, we find that the second-best number of firms, nsb, satisfies,
W
0(nsb) = (nsb) 
(a  c)2
h
2bd
 
n3sb + n
2
sb   6nsb   6

+ (nsb + 1)
3 b2d2 + 8
i
nd
3
= 0:
In addition, we have
W
0(n)

K=0
=
(a  c)2d
3
h
b2d2(n+ 1)3   2bd(n4 + 2n3   3n2   3n+ 1)  4n
i
= 0
when
bd =
n3 + n2   4n+ 1 +pn6 + 2n5   7n4   6n3 + 22n2   4n+ 1
(n+ 1)2
; (14)
andW 00(n) < 0. Therefore, we find that
lim
K!0
nsb = n;
such that n satisfies the condition of (14). In other words, the second-best number of firms is positive
and finite even when there are no entry costs.
Then, we find that
W
0(nf ) =  
(a  c)2
h
2bd
 
n3sb + n
2
sb   6nsb   6

+ (nsb + 1)
3 b2d2 + 8
i
nd
3
< 0;
which indicates that free entry necessarily results in excessive entry.
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Corollary 3 Under linear demand, constant marginal production cost, and quadratic investment cost,
the free-entry equilibrium of the sequential co-opetition game yields excessive entry. Furthermore, this
result holds even when there are no entry costs.
We provide some numerical examples. In the case of a = 10, b = 1, c = 1, d = 2, and K = 2, then
nf  6 > nsb  2. In the case of a = 10, b = 1, c = 1, d = 8, and K = 0, then nf = 1 > nsb  5,
which clearly shows that excess entry property holds even whenK = 0.
 Constant elasticity demand case
From (12), the free-entry equilibrium number of firms, nf , satisfies
(nf ) =
c2 [c(2nf   1) + 2adnf (nf   1) ]
2dn2f (nf   1)2
 K = 0:
From the fact that (n) is strictly decreasing in n and limn!1 =  K, we confirm
lim
K!0
nf =1;
which indicates that the free-entry number of firms goes to infinity when there are no entry costs. After
some tedious manipulation, we find that the second-best number of firms, nsb, satisfies,
W
0(nsb) = (nsb) 
c2
(n  1)3dn2sb
"
adnsb  (nsb  1) f(nsb   1)  1g
+ cfnsb(n2sb   4) + nsb(nsb  1) + 1 + g
#
= 0:
Then, we find that
W
0(nf ) =  
c2
(n  1)3dn2f
"
adnf  (nf   1) f(nf   1)  1g
+ cfnf (n2f   4) + nf (nf   1) + 1 + g
#
< 0;
which indicates that free entry necessarily results in excessive entry.
Corollary 4 Under constant elasticity demand, constant marginal production cost, and quadratic in-
vestment cost, the free-entry equilibrium of the sequential co-opetition game yields excessive entry. Fur-
thermore, this result holds even when there are no entry costs.
In this sequential co-opetition game, as Corollaries 3 and 4 indicate, the well-known excess entry
theorem, developed by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987), applies even
when there are no entry (set-up) costs for entrants. In their model, free entry results in the socially optimal
number of firms when there are no entry costs. Our results reflect that as the number of firms increases,
the total amount of socially beneficial investment is reduced, which is independent of the existence of
fixed set-up costs.10
In this constant elasticity demand case, the second-best number of firms when K = 0 cannot be
analytically derived, so we provide some numerical examples to show that excess entry property holds
even when K = 0. In the case of a = 20, c = 0:1, d = 4, and  = 2, nf  31 > nsb  7 holds for
K = 0:1 and nf  1 > nsb  9 holds forK = 0.
10Ghosh and Saha (2007) also show the possibility of excess entry without fixed entry costs but in the presence of marginal
cost difference.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In many industries, firms share a common property resource that affects the market size or consumers’
willingness to pay for the products and contributes to the common property resources. This paper inves-
tigates whether free entry leads to socially excessive or insufficient entry in a co-opetitive model where
firms compete and cooperate with each other at the same time. We explore two approaches to modeling
firms’ co-opetitive behavior: simultaneous and sequential co-opetition. We find that, in the simultaneous
co-opetition case, in which firms simultaneously decide upon their investments and outputs, free entry
leads to insufficient or excessive entry depending on the relative magnitude of the business stealing and
common resource effects of entry. In particular, free entry is more likely to result in socially insuffi-
cient entry when production and investment costs are smaller and price elasticity is greater. On the other
hand, in the sequential co-opetition case, in which firms can use investment as a commitment, free en-
try leads to excess entry due to the negative common property effect. Interestingly, this excessive-entry
result holds even when there are no entry (set-up) costs. These findings contribute to the literature on
excess-entry property in oligopoly markets.
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